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The Political Economy of Renewable 
Energy Investment in Ghana
Simon Bawakyillenuo*1
Abstract The high level of fossil fuel consumption globally is wreaking havoc 
on the global climate through the emissions of greenhouse gases. Against this 
backdrop, there have been calls from national and international stakeholders 
for a transition towards renewable energy (RE). However, the investment and 
adoption of renewable energy technologies especially, in developing countries 
have been woefully inadequate. Even though various policy and legislative 
instruments in support of RE development abound in Ghana, the contribution 
of RE to the energy generation mix is notably insignificant, due to constraints 
that limit high investment. Using the Political Economy Analysis (PEA) 
approach, this article examines the deficiencies in these policy strategies, and 
unravels the complexity as well as the alignments of interests of stakeholders 
regarding policies that could provide a more favourable investment in 
renewables in Ghana. The article recommends that Ghana’s leaders champion 
those policies with the highest support across all stakeholders.
Keywords: political economy, renewable energy, binding constraints, 
Ghana, low investment, abundant policies.
1 Introduction
Provisions for renewable energy (RE) development have featured in the 
energy policy regimes of  Ghana for some time now. The just‑ended 
national Medium‑Term Development Policy – Ghana Shared Growth and 
Development Agenda Two (GSGDA II) – talks about the need to increase 
the proportion of  RE in the energy supply mix, particularly solar, wind, 
mini‑hydro, and waste‑to‑energy (NDPC 2014). The current energy policy 
of  the country also sets a policy target of  10 per cent contribution of  RE to 
the country’s energy generation mix by 2020 (MoE 2010). In addition, there 
is the Renewable Energy Act, 2011 (Act 832), which gives legislative backing 
to the promotion and development of  renewable energy technologies (RETs). 
The feed-in tariff (FiT), mini-grid infrastructure systems development and the 
RE Fund are provisions in the RE Act (Act 832) that demonstrate Ghana’s 
quest to diversify its energy sources to take account of  RE.
Notwithstanding the existence of  these various policies and legislative 
instruments in support of  RE development in Ghana, the contribution 
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of  RE sources to the country’s energy generation mix is abysmal. 
At present, the share of  RE in the power generation mix is about 
0.1 per cent (Energy Commission of  Ghana 2015) and with less 
than four years left, the 10 per cent share target is unlikely to be met 
by 2020. Paradoxically, Ghana is signatory to several international 
agreements, including the post‑2015 United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals that aim at tackling climate change and variability 
through environmentally sustainable development pathways such as 
the enhancement of  RETs. In practice, however, the development 
trajectories being pursued are unsustainable and not in sync with these 
goals (UNEP 2013, 2015). Presently, about 56.5 per cent of  installed 
electricity generation capacity in Ghana is fossil fuel‑based thermal, 
generating about 49 per cent of  total electricity (Energy Commission 
of  Ghana 2016). What is more, the government envisions increasing 
thermal power generation to about 80 per cent in the next decade.2 
This raises a question regarding which pathways could lead to the 
development of  the RE niche within the existing energy regime 
(Power et al. 2016).
This article aims to unravel the complexity of  stakeholders’ alignments 
and interests with regard to policies to support RE investment in 
Ghana. Moreover, this article contributes to expanding the literature on 
the understudied political economy of  energy transitions (Power et al. 
2016 citing Goldthau and Sovacool 2012), especially in a developing 
country like Ghana.
The article is structured into seven sections. Following this introductory 
section is Section 2, which reviews literature on the political economy of  
RE investment. Section 3 discusses the historical policy and institutional 
regimes of  Ghana’s energy sector. Section 4 details the Political 
Economy Analysis (PEA) methodological perspectives underpinning 
this article and how the binding constraints on RE investment in 
Ghana were identified, as well as the mapping of  promising policies 
with potential to address these constraints. Discussions and analyses of  
the obstructing factors of  the key policies and initiatives fundamental 
to RE investment are encapsulated in Section 5. Section 6 covers the 
intervention policies, while Section 7 provides the conclusion.
2 The political economy of renewable energy investment – a review
Until the twenty-first century, fossil fuel sources dominated global 
energy supply and consumption. They accounted for about 80 per 
cent of  the world’s total primary energy supply and 64 per cent of  
electricity generation in 1999 (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). In recent 
times, however, there are increasing calls for a paradigm shift towards 
RE generation (ibid.). These calls are aimed at ensuring the mitigation 
of  greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from fossil fuel consumption. 
Nonetheless, the adoption of  RETs is met with stiff opposition, mainly 
from high-profile fossil fuel energy players, who obstruct the process 
and subsequently promote their interest (Barnett, Stockbridge and 
Kingsmill 2016). Additionally, the uncertainty related to who bears the 
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cost of  the transition to clean energy landscapes, especially in developing 
countries, further obstructs the process (Newell and Mulvaney 2013).
A complete understanding of  the reasons behind such opposition is 
crucial for the successful development of  RE since that will help provide 
sustainable solutions to the root causes reinforcing the low investment 
in a developing country such as Ghana. A PEA approach provides 
the necessary scope to unearth such reasons that fuel opposition from 
stakeholders to investment in RE. Newell et al. (2014) observe that 
a political economy analysis creates the pathway to get beneath the 
formal structures in a bid to discover the underlying interests, incentives, 
and institutions that foster or frustrate change. It could also help to 
consolidate the interests of  all energy players in order to facilitate 
the paradigm shift of  accelerating the rate of  development of  RETs. 
According to Arndt (1983), the political economy (PE) concept has 
a broad range of  applications and offers in-depth analysis of  what 
an ordinary study may not be able to tease out. For instance, a PE 
application to an organisation could enhance a better understanding 
of  the interaction between sets of  major economic and sociopolitical 
forces that affect collective behaviour and performances within such 
an organisation (Achrol, Reve and Stern 1983). In the energy sector, its 
application aids in the understanding of  the complexity surrounding 
clean energy transitional issues – justice, injustice, losers, and winners 
(Newell and Mulvaney 2013; Baker, Newell and Phillips 2014; Power 
et al. 2016). According to Isoaho, Goritz and Schulz (2016), the recent 
application of  PEA in energy‑related issues such as RE development is 
due to the fact that socio‑technical literature failed to address adequately 
the complexity and dynamics of  clean energy development. A PEA 
should therefore identify all forms of:
competing ideas, interests, values and preferences; where specific 
groups and interests struggle over the control, production, use and 
distribution of  resources; where conflict is negotiated; where bargains 
are struck; and where formal and informal political settlements, 
alliances and coalitions are made and broken (Hudson and Leftwich 
2014: 6, cited in Barnett 2014).
Unequivocally, the use of  PEA should help to understand why socially 
and economically, desirable plans and policies are regarded as being 
difficult to be implemented by policymakers (Barnett et al. 2016).
Khan (2011), using a PEA approach, studied the situation under which a 
ruling government or a coalition in the power sector will promote clean 
energy development. He documents that a change towards clean energy 
transition is most likely to happen if  governments or ruling coalitions 
face pressure from powerful groups in society who either are negatively 
affected by current non-renewable energy sources or stand to benefit from 
clean energy promotion. In the study by Tsebelis (2002), which focuses on 
India, PEA underpins the analysis on the extent to which RE sources can 
be developed to their fullest capacity in the country. The study concludes 
144 | Bawakyillenuo The Political Economy of Renewable Energy Investment in Ghana
Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’
that, in order to bring RE development into the policy arena, stakeholders 
with vested interests and veto powers – such as the mining companies, 
and the coal power producers – are critical to breaking strong oppositions 
to RE development. Other works (Newell and Mulvaney 2013), however, 
reiterate the need to be mindful of  the justice dimension of  ‘clean energy’ 
or low‑carbon transition amid the quest for success.
In related studies, Fattouh and El-Katiri (2015) and Oda and Tsujita 
(2010) also applied PEA to study factors that prevent governments and 
energy players from implementing certain economic and environmental 
policies. Citizenry agitations for fair share of  natural resources (oils 
and fossil resources and grid extension) and the fear of  losing elections 
by political actors emerged strongly as factors accounting for the 
non‑implementation of  such policies. The Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region lends clear evidence to this, in which the 
incessant protests and agitations waged by the citizenry for social equity 
and fair sharing of  national resources have compelled governments to 
subsidise fossil fuel energy sources (Fattouh and El-Katiri 2015). In Asia, 
Commander (2012) observes similar occurrences, as political unrest 
and protests forced governments to keep prices of  petrol and diesel 
substantively lower than international prices between 2008 and 2010. 
Such agitations from citizens and the fear of  losing political power have 
the effect of  influencing governments and policymakers to overlook 
viable RE development policies. Oda and Tsujita (2010) argue that 
these protests and political unrest are more common in jurisdictions that 
lack democratic institutions. Brown and Mobarak (2009) further argue 
that countries without democratic political systems and institutional 
structures often use energy allocations and subsidies as tools for political 
advantage. Supporting this view, Scott and Seth (2013) submit that 
often, in non‑democratic states, electricity distribution favours industries 
rather than residential areas, which becomes a source of  the protest. 
Such motives and actions greatly affect the development of  RE.
Gupta and Köhlin (2006) note that there is an opportunity cost of  
failing to sell energy at actual market prices, and as such, revenue can 
be used by government in diverse ways including the reduction of  
budget deficit and the size of  the public debt; and increasing investment 
expenditure in cheaper, clean, and environmentally friendly energy 
technologies which can generate several socioeconomic benefits. 
According to Sdralevich et al. (2014), although these policies seek to 
promote social equity, in reality they actually benefit people within 
the middle and upper classes. Indicative of  the above literature is the 
increasing economic and environmental costs of  fossil fuel faced by 
many developing economies, yet RE sources in these economies remain 
significantly underdeveloped through inadequate investments.
3 Policy and institutional regimes of Ghana’s energy sector
Electricity generation in Ghana can broadly be classified into three 
main phases: ‘before the Akosombo era’ (1914 to 1966), the ‘Hydro 
Years’ (1966 to mid‑1980s) and the ‘Thermal Complementation Years’ 
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(from mid‑1980s to present) (ISSER 2005). The pre‑Akosombo era had 
small‑scale electricity generation from diesel‑powered generators. These 
were owned by individuals, institutions, and towns that could afford 
them. The first public power plant was established in 1914 in Sekondi 
and was used to power the operations and activities of  the then Gold 
Coast Railway Administration (GCRA) (ibid.). In 1922, small‑scale 
public electricity was established and operated by the then public works 
department (PWD) to electrify major towns in Ghana. It covered the 
Accra township and later in 1926, coverage was extended to Koforidua. 
Between 1927 and 1932, the PWD undertook a restricted evening supply 
arrangement system to Kumasi, Swedru, Tamale, and Cape Coast 
townships (ibid.). During this era, determination of  power generation was 
carried out solely by Ghana’s colonial leaders, some public institutions 
(such as PWD and GCRA), and individuals who were financially sound 
to own and operate generator sets. Issues of  climate change and RE 
development were non‑existent in the objectives of  energy generation as 
they were not subjects of  utmost concern at the time.
Energy security and to some extent RE development, however, became 
more relevant in the ‘Hydro Years’ of  power generation in Ghana. 
The desire to develop Ghana’s huge bauxite reserves as part of  having 
integrated the bauxite and aluminium industries marked the beginning 
of  the hydro years (ibid.). This era saw a much more organised power 
sector, as Cabinet passed the Volta River Development Act 1961 
(Act 46) for the establishment of  the Volta River Authority (VRA). The 
VRA was mandated to foresee the construction of  the Akosombo dam, 
its power station as well as the generation of  electricity (ibid.). In 1967, 
a law (NLCD 125) was passed for the establishment of  the Electricity 
Corporation of  Ghana (ECG). This enhanced the setting up of  vibrant 
institutions to oversee adequate production of  energy that fed industries 
and businesses, and subsequently offered job opportunities in diverse 
forms. Energy security emerged as an important element under this era 
because other initiatives were introduced to develop more hydro sites 
in addition to the Akosombo Power Plant (Edjekumhene, Amadu and 
Brew‑Hammond 2001). Unlike the pre‑hydro years, this era marked the 
beginning of  modern electricity generation in Ghana and did involve 
the participation of  several stakeholders.
The thermal complementary phase of  Ghana’s power sector was highly 
driven by energy security issues and little about the development of  
other competitive energy resources. Climate change mitigation issues 
were of  little concern as evidence shows that the development of  the 
power sector within this era propelled the increase in the country’s 
carbon footprint. According to Opam and Turkson (2000), this era 
was necessitated by the adverse effect of  the prolonged drought that 
occurred between 1982 and 1984 in the country. On the basis of  the 
drought, the generation potentials of  the existing two hydro power 
plants (Akosombo and Kpong) were affected as the available water was 
far below the minimum operating level (ibid.). The shortage in electricity 
supply amid the growing energy demand sector necessitated the major 
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reformation of  the power sector. Thus, in 1985, the Government of  
Ghana commissioned the ‘Ghana Generation Planning Study’ (GGPS) 
to help identify alternative energy sources that will aid in reducing the 
vulnerability of  the hydro power systems (ISSER 2005). The study 
recommended thermal as part of  Ghana’s energy mix.
Lack of  competitiveness and private sector participation, coupled 
with the poor financial performance of  Ghana’s power sector, drove 
its reformation in the 1990s. According to Opam and Turkson (2000), 
such factors made Ghana’s traditional financiers (e.g. the World Bank) 
reluctant in providing extra financial resources to support the thermal 
complementary phase of  the power sector. The GGPS of  the VRA 
estimated over US$1.5bn as the amount that was needed to finance 
infrastructure development at the electricity sector of  Ghana (ISSER 
2005). This came at the time when the World Bank was unwilling 
to finance non-performing energy sectors in Africa unless issues of  
transparency, regulation, importation of  services, commercialisation and 
corporatisation, commitment lending, and private investment were met 
by energy sectors (Amoako-Tuffor and Asamoah 2015). However, the 
motives for undertaking this reform were not only limited to the financial 
challenges confronting the sector. According to Opam, UN ECOSOC 
and UN ECA (1995), issues of  productivity losses of  the overall economy 
as a result of  the ineffective operation of  the then power sector, coupled 
with rapid power interruptions and high cost associated with back‑ups, 
necessitated the reform. Overwhelming debt burdens, supply‑side 
preferences, and under‑utilised energy conservation practices were other 
factors that influenced the decision to reform Ghana’s power sector 
(ibid.). Increasing efficiency of  asset utilisation, and making necessary 
policies and institutional changes that will ensure economic equity were 
other supplementary motives for initiating the reform (Sustainable 
Energy Regulation and Policymaking for Africa, n.d.).
The Government of  Ghana, upon agreeing to the terms and 
requirements of  the World Bank, contracted SYNEX Consulting 
Engineers of  Chile to provide policy directions that could ensure 
competition and engagement of  private investors (Edjekumhene et al. 
2001; Amoako-Tuffor and Asamoah 2015). In 1994, the firm proposed 
a new power market with policy directions that aimed at meeting the 
requirements of  the World Bank. Some of  the policy recommendations 
by the firm were free entry of  private investors on the power generation 
side as well as decentralisation of  the distribution arm of  the sector; 
establishment of  an Economic Load Dispatch Centre that will be 
responsible for planning the operation of  the system so as to minimise 
operating costs; and the existence of  different distributors with each 
operating in a defined concession area (SYNEX Consulting Engineers 
1994, cited in Edjekumhene et al. 2001).
Following these policy recommendations, the government issued a 
statement on ‘Power Sector Policy’ to serve as a framework that meets 
the regulatory and transparency requirements of  the World Bank. 
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This statement also proposed the formation of  the Power Sector 
Reform Committee (PSRC) to oversee the design and implementation 
of  the reform (Opam and Turkson 2000; Edjekumhene et al. 2001). 
Obligations such as the assignment of  mandates for power generation, 
transmission and distribution, promoting a competitive power market, a 
regulatory framework for price and tariff revision, and establishment of  
an institutional framework, rested on the shoulders of  the PSRC (ibid.). 
The PSRC proposed a ‘four‑point Action Plan’ to the government of  
Ghana in 1997 (Edjekumhene et al. 2001):
 l Introduction of  new legislation to establish a new body to replace 
the then existing National Energy Board (NEB) which will introduce 
explicit regulations, rules of  practice, and standards of  performance 
for governing the power sector;
 l Introduction of  ‘open access’ in the power sector to ensure healthy 
competition;
 l Engineering all stated‑owned private utilities into ‘strategic 
business units’ that can help improve accountability and financial 
management through public–private partnerships and joint ventures;
 l Introduction of  guidelines and procedures for transparency in tariff 
settings.
Arguably, the past institutional and policy regimes of  the energy sector 
of  Ghana from the pre‑hydro era to the early 2000s buttressed the 
dominant existing hydro and thermal energy infrastructural niches in 
the country. Indeed, it has been argued that the energy infrastructures in 
most parts of  the global South are connected to historical antecedents 
in the socioeconomic and political realms, and hence, their development 
is shaped by various path dependencies (Power et al. 2016). Moreover, 
the enthusiasm and contestations exuded by the two dominant political 
parties (the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress) 
in the wake of  the discovery of  oil in 2007 (Phillips, Hailwood 
and Brooks 2016), and the subsequent improved gas infrastructure 
development compared to the weak RE infrastructure development, 
vindicate the existing infrastructural dominance of  thermal‑led energy.
4 Methodology
The methodology used for this study is informed by the Political 
Economy Analysis of  Climate Change Policies (PEACH) Methodology 
by Schmitz (2012) and the PEA framework by Barnett et al. (2016). 
The PEACH methodology focuses on answering the central question: 
who drives/obstructs certain policies? According to Schmitz (2012), an 
application of  the PEA in climate change issues should be able to bring 
out relevant sector players who by their actions and policy priorities 
promote or obstruct such initiatives. Accordingly, a PEA should be 
capable of  setting out the key challenges of  which the study intends 
to investigate, such as ‘Who drives/obstructs climate change policies 
in the rising powers?’ (ibid.: 1). It examines the complexities (actors, 
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institutions, and motivations) and is based on identifying the various 
stakeholders involved, including their diverse priorities. This, therefore, 
demands the mapping of  identified stakeholders in a power priority 
matrix according to their direct and indirect influence on policymaking 
and implementation, and analysing their competing narratives. Using 
narratives from in‑depth interviews of  sector players, the PEA analysis 
through the PEACH lens embodies four parts: mapping stakeholders 
according to priority; discussions on the proponents and opponents of  
policies; mapping the level of  influence of  stakeholders on such policies; 
and identification of  coalitions for change (Schmitz 2012).
On the other hand, the PEA framework developed by Barnett et al. 
(2016) to understand the issues of  poor performance of  Africa’s 
power sector despite several years of  donor support, encompasses a 
four-stage process: problem identification; diagnosis; prognosis; and 
interventions (Table 1). The problem identification stage is in synchrony 
with Schmitz’s (2012) position of  ‘setting out the key challenge’ from 
the onset. The methodology for this current study is, therefore, a 
hybrid of  the PEACH methodology (ibid.) and Barnett et al.’s (2016) 
PEA framework – an adoption of  elements from both approaches 
that are deemed pertinent to establishing an understanding of  the 
subject matter. Thus, key elements including problem identification 
(already captured in Section 1 as low investment in the renewable 
energy sector in Ghana); diagnosis (identification of  binding constraints 
to renewable energy investments); prognosis (mapping of  promising 
policies); mapping of  stakeholders to ascertain the varied narratives; 
and identification of  alternative interventions, constitute the analytical 
framework for this study.
The identification of  the binding constraints to investment in renewable 
energy investment in Ghana was carried out by a previous study by 
Pueyo et al. (2017). Using a framework drawing from growth diagnostics 
(Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco 2004), that research accumulated 
evidence through the analysis of  indicators and interviews to rank 
constraints in Ghana according to their importance, or ‘binding’ 
character. The evidence accumulated in Ghana pointed at constraints 
preventing sufficient returns to investment at an acceptable risk and 
Table 1 PEA framework
1 Problem identification For example, poor performance in the power sector 
2 Diagnosis 
What features of the political economy generate and 
contribute to the persistence of the problem? 
3 Prognosis 
Given the diagnosis, what is the potential for change, and 
what are the mostly likely pathways of change? 
4 Interventions 
How can particular actors help to shift the pattern of 
incentives in a manner that promotes desirable change?
Source Barnett et al. (2016).
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also at constraints limiting the availability of  adequate finance for 
RE investment. The four factors damaging the risk-return profile 
of  investment relate to an unreliable off-taker, poor regulation, 
macroeconomic imbalances, and corruption. On the other hand, scarce 
domestic finance and high returns expectations for short-term loans are 
behind the insufficient supply of  finance (Pueyo et al. 2017).
This article goes beyond the identification of  key constraints to analyse 
the political economy of  their solutions. High-profile representatives 
of  31 organisations,3 belonging to private and public sectors; civil 
society organisations; academia; the utilities; and research thinktanks 
that have key interest, as well as playing significant roles in the energy 
landscapes and regimes development in the country, were sampled 
randomly after all relevant stakeholders were mapped, for both the 
administration of  in‑depth interviews and questionnaires from June to 
October 2016. Drawing on the data from the in‑depth interviews, three 
binding constraints to RE investment in Ghana were unearthed through 
prioritisation by interviewees: off-taker risk; inadequate power sector 
regulation; and lack of  access to appropriate finance. Similarly, relevant 
potential policies that could have been used to help unlock these binding 
constraints, but did not, were mapped through a review of  various 
literature sources and the in‑depth interviews (Table 2).
The next section explores the alignment of  Ghanaian stakeholders 
with respect to the potential policies that could solve the constraints to 
investment in RE.
Table 2 Binding constraints on RE investment in Ghana and potential policies
Binding constraint Policy
Off-taker risk
Privatisation of the revenue arm of the power sector 
Improved management of ECG including revenue collection 
(especially revenue from debtors – government and others) 
Promotion of efficient technical practices within the 
distribution arm of the power sector through privatisation
Establishment of a competitive off-taker market in the 
power sector 
Inadequate power 
sector regulation
Establishment of a full-time high-level independent power 
producer (IPP) facilitator in the power sector
Establishment of a reliable and transparent full-cost tariff 
pricing system
Full implementation of the RE Act (Act 832) and its 
enshrined subsidiary instruments (net-metering, mini-grid 
systems, and the RE Fund and levies)
Lack of access to 
appropriate finance
Establishment of RE financial instruments within domestic 
banks by government with lower interest rates
Source Author’s compilation from literature sources and in-depth interviews.
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5 Analysis and discussion
Having identified policies that could have been used to address the 
binding constraints to RE investment in Ghana, the analysis and 
discussion focus on why such policies have been ineffectual in the past. 
The proponents and opponents of  these policies are teased out from the 
in‑depth interview scripts. Our interviews were not able to gauge the 
extent of  the power of  each of  the stakeholders to achieve their goals 
when these conflict with those of  other stakeholders.
5.1 Off-taker risk constraint
The non-existence of  a credible off-taker in Ghana’s power sector 
remains a key disincentive to investment in energy and especially in 
renewables as this typically has higher upfront costs. The inability of  the 
present off-taker (ECG) to maintain a credible and resounding financial 
balance sheet as a result of  low electricity prices and bottlenecks with 
revenue collection underscores investment risks. Narratives from 
stakeholders underpinning why the credit‑unworthiness of  the present 
off-taker dissuades investors from investing in Ghana’s power sector 
resonate with findings by African Energy (2014).
An important constraint is that the off-taker is not financially credible. They 
are unable to pay their bills. (A senior officer at Renewable Energy 
Promotion, Energy Commission of  Ghana)4
We can’t call ECG a credible off-taker. So now, it is a major bottleneck… who 
would buy the power I’m generating and can pay at the end of  the month? Most 
of  the people who have got PPAs [power purchasing agreements] from 
ECG are asking for further guarantees because of  their notorious track record of  
being unable to pay. (A senior officer at KITE)
The policies counting with the highest support in our interviews 
included the privatisation of  the revenue arm of  the power sector and 
the improved management of  the national distribution company.
5.1.1 Privatisation of the revenue arm of the power sector
One of  the key policy interventions that could help to unlock the 
off-taker risk in the power sector is the privatisation of  the revenue 
arm of  the power sector. This policy has been strongly supported by 
donors, and particularly by the United State’s Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. A private, competitive retail market would be solely driven 
by the objective of  profit maximisation. Accordingly, it would not be 
subject to political interference demanding, for example, lower tariffs, or 
exemption from paying their bills for public administration consumers. 
Such private retailers would also be more likely to implement innovative 
monitoring and metering systems resulting in higher revenue collection, 
the narrative goes (Eberhard et al. 2008).
Several counter‑narratives oppose the privatisation approach, mainly 
the fear of  tariff escalation; ideological perspectives of  ECG as a 
national identity; and job uncertainty.
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According to Hall, Lobina and Motte (2005), initiatives towards 
privatisation of  essential national assets such as the energy sector are 
never without oppositions for the fear of  price increment. Privatisation 
in most cases widens the affordability gap, increasing the population 
who cannot afford services that used to be provided by the public 
institutions (ibid.). Hall et al. (2005) and Nellis (2003), dwelling on the 
negative implications associated with privatisation, note that it increases 
the cost of  living, deepening poverty. Such fears by citizenry have 
negative effects on governance due to the ‘patron–client relationship’ 
practices in developing countries in which there is a trade market for 
cost of  electricity and votes (Barnett et al. 2016). Narratives from the 
in‑depth interviews indeed attest to the fact that the fear of  increase in 
tariff has been pursued by various stakeholders over time to block the 
implementation of  this intervention as this one shows:
I think the stakeholders that are kicking against this are basically the final consumers 
who in effect have witnessed tremendous increase in electricity tariffs. The fact is 
you are bringing a third party, which we see will be more efficient and more effective. 
The fact too, however, is that we also have information about the cost of  electricity 
being higher than how much we are paying and it means that a third party who is 
coming in with a business motive or private motive will need to break even or make 
profit for that matter through high cost of  electricity tariffs. So, consumers would then 
try to fight against those things. (A senior officer at KASA-Ghana)
Second, the belief  that ECG is a national asset and should stay as such 
also emerged strongly as a reason against privatisation. According 
to this narrative, the government has no moral right to either sell or 
give out ECG’s function to a foreign private entity since that will be 
tantamount to weakening the country’s sovereignty.
Looking at what is happening and the attempt by government through MiDA 
to give ECG to a company to manage as a concession for 25 years, it’s on a 
large scale and taking it from the hands of  Ghanaians to a foreign company. 
(A senior officer at KASA-Ghana)
Ownership should be Ghanaian. It should be listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange so 
that every Ghanaian will be a shareholder. In that way, it will still be for Ghanaians 
but it will mean government cannot take out anything from the ECG.5 (Chief  
policy analyst, Ghana Institute for Public Policy Options (GIPPO))
Concerns about job security and the possible creation of  jobs for only 
a few elites are the third most frequent arguments against the policy 
instrument of  privatising the revenue arm of  ECG. While assurance 
has been given in the MiDA Compact II deal, emphasising that no 
ECG worker would be laid off in the first five years6 of  the concession, 
opponents of  the initiative, including ECG workers, are not entirely 
convinced about the provision, since they are unsure of  their retentions 
after the first five years. This uncertainty has triggered a series of  strike 
actions7 by ECG workers against government. Birdsall and Nellis (2003) 
observe that privatisation unfairly disenfranchises workers.
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They [ECG workers] have legitimate concerns because they are afraid of  job 
securities and are not sure what the private entity would do. (A senior officer at 
ACEP)
I think it’s really job security, first of  all. Maybe pride a little bit, but job security 
and mistrust of  whoever is coming in, that they are simply coming to make money 
on top of  their labour. (A senior officer at Solar Light Ghana)
5.1.2 Improved management of ECG
As an alternative to privatisation, the improved management of  ECG 
would result in a more efficient revenue collection from debtors – 
government and others. Authors (Hall et al. 2005; Barnett et al. 2016) 
argue that the privatisation of  the energy sector in Africa would not 
be necessary if  there were mechanisms in place to avoid governments’ 
interferences. The inability of  Ghana’s power sector off-taker to 
function effectively is attributable to long-standing interferences by 
various governments. Unsurprisingly, the government itself  is identified 
as the main obstruction for the improved management of  ECG.
I will say that the reason why some people are kicking against it [privatisation] 
is because they feel that government is the cause of  the problem so don’t blame it on 
ECG. Government owes ECG so much and they feel if  government can put in place 
measures to curtail this, then ECG can operate efficiently. (A senior officer at 
Renewable Energy Promotion, Energy Commission of  Ghana)
But we do know that what has crippled the ECG is not that we don’t have 
people with brains to deliver but it has been the interference of  government to 
just cripple them and the solution is to either make them independent or to give it 
to a private entity to handle, which also brings the independence that is required. 
(A senior officer at ACEP)
It has been argued that Ghana’s government seems powerless to resist 
external pressures requiring privatisation as a precondition for financial 
assistance, mainly through the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
Compact II. Hence, its inability to support the initiative of  improved 
management of  ECG. For instance, Mehrotra and Delamonica 
(2005) observe that in most privatisation initiatives in developing 
countries, donor partners and international organisations strongly push 
governments to accept the deals, with a lot of  them being done behind 
the scene without proper consultation.
When something is coming from outside Ghana we are going to push back 
easily, good or not. So, what would have been nice is for us to recognise that 
the way we run these parastatals over the years has been wrong. So we need a 
government that is mature enough to step out and say no. (A senior officer at 
Solar Light Ghana)
Another critical intervention to unlock the off-taker binding constraint 
is the provision of  guarantees for power producers in Ghana. However, 
the government cannot commit to high levels of  debt and a lack of  
financial resources.
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’ 141–164 | 153
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
5.2 Inadequate power sector regulation constraint
Effective regulation of  the power sector with incentivised strategies 
tailored towards RE development are paramount to boosting investment 
in RE sources. All over the world, different countries are formulating 
and implementing such policies on RE, to enhance energy security 
and climate change mitigation drives. Although Ghana’s power sector 
regulatory regime aims at diversifying energy portfolios in order to 
enhance the green economy, it is still fraught with challenges that 
undermine RE investors’ confidence. Three policy interventions that 
could have addressed the inadequate regulatory constraint in Ghana, had 
an RE agenda been attended to seriously, were unearthed: establishment 
of  a full‑time level facilitator in the power sector; establishment of  
a reliable and transparent full-cost tariff pricing system; and full 
implementation of  the RE Act (Act 832) and its subsidiary instruments.
Regarding the setting up of  a full‑time level facilitator in the power sector, 
opposers have argued that it is unnecessary and will only bring about extra 
cost, since current practices in the power sector already take account of  
that. Concerning the setting up of  a reliable and transparent full-cost tariff 
pricing system, opposers have gone against it on the basis that electricity 
prices will increase; and secondly, electricity is regarded as a public good. 
The lack of  full implementation of  the RE Act (Act 832) is attributable 
to the non‑incentivisation approach to RE development in Ghana; RE 
is not considered as an immediate priority by policymakers compared to 
thermal energy and lack of  political will. The following narratives give 
credence to the weaknesses of  the regulatory environment as a result of  
the energy regimes and infrastructure niches supported by state:
We have the key issue as being the Renewable Energy Act, which says that the 
tariffs cannot be changed before 10 years. But then for investment like this, we are 
looking at a lifespan of  20 to 30 years. So if  an investor is only guaranteed for 
10 years then what happens to the 10 or 20 years left? So, these are some of  the 
issues that hold back some of  these investors. (A senior officer at ECG)
The truth of  the matter is that when it comes to the renewables, the approach 
has always been different even in matured democracies and matured countries 
like the UK and the US. There were incentive mechanisms through the FiT with 
the obligation to pay. We cannot do otherwise because our scenario is even more 
complicated. (A senior officer at KITE)
You have one arm of  government or ministry promoting a green agenda and the other 
doing something that contradicts it. Ghana signed up to the Sustainable Energy for 
All initiative and our president chaired a session in the UN on sustainable energy, 
but we are talking about coal. So there is a disconnection between various government 
agencies leading on policies on energy and environmental sustainability. (A senior 
officer at KITE)
I don’t even think the minister [former minister of  power] ever thought of  
the renewable option whenever as a credible option. His thoughts were all about 
how to get fuel and thermal plants running, whereas you don’t need fuel for 
renewables. (A senior officer, ACEP)
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5.3 Lack of access to appropriate finance
Financial instruments remain essential ingredients for the development 
of  RE. It is therefore not surprising that governments and policymakers 
in developed countries create economic and financial incentives to 
facilitate the development of  renewable energy technologies. According 
to Painuly (2001), credit subsidy was introduced in Denmark to finance 
RE development for a ten-year period. Other financial instruments 
such as tax exemptions, credit facilities, and third-party financing 
mechanisms are also introduced in other jurisdictions in developed 
economies to boost RE investment (IEA Renewable Energy Working 
Party 2002).
A fundamental factor sustaining the lack of  appropriate finance 
in Ghana, which in turn affects RE investment is the low financial 
portfolios of  domestic banks. Despite its positive effect on RE 
development, current financial portfolios of  domestic banks cannot 
make the policy implementable. The high risk of  doing business 
coupled with the low portfolios of  domestic banks makes it difficult for 
entrepreneurs to access loans. This affects the pricing of  electricity from 
RE sources, which also affects consumers’ willingness to appreciate the 
usefulness of  the technology, as it is perceived to be expensive relative to 
other technologies.
The technology is still a bit expensive and you need to get a good feed-in tariff 
before you can make good business. Unfortunately, we also don’t have flexible 
financing schemes. We still have to deal with the same commercial banks and 
they don’t understand the investment aspect in the renewables. They are still doing 
short-term loans with 30 per cent to 35 per cent interest rates. (A senior officer 
at KITE)
6 Emerging interventions for change
Our interviews8 revealed institutional patterns of  support or opposition 
as well as alternative policies that could gather more support than those 
opposed. However, the article could not establish clear‑cut coalitions for 
or against policies due to insufficient information on how stakeholders 
exert power differently. The majority of  these stakeholders have not 
evolved from the mere expression of  support for or opposition to the 
policies, to building coalitions, and exertion of  different influences 
to bring about these changes. In the view of  a key stakeholder: 
‘Networking and advocacy for RE development by civil society 
organisations and allied groups have been weak in Ghana’ (a senior 
officer, ACEP). The graphs included in this section depict the group of  
stakeholders that support (upper part) and those that oppose (lower part) 
the potential policies that could boost RE development in the country. 
The policy proposed is presented under the horizontal axis and the 
dominant suggested alternative is presented in the centre.
The privatisation of  the revenue arm of  the power sector policy 
received high‑level support from the majority of  the institutions, with 
only PUWU, GII, TUC, and Solar Light opposing this policy (Figure 1). 
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Various alternative policies have been proposed by these stakeholders 
as being capable of  addressing the off-taker risk constraint. However, 
only stakeholders from GIPC, MiDA and IGC, who support the policy, 
and PUWU and Solar Light Company, who oppose the policy, have 
proposed a common alternative policy intervention. This alternative 
policy intervention to the privatisation of  the revenue arm of  the 
power sector entails guaranteeing the independence of  ECG, including 
government non‑interference, since it will facilitate the expansion of  the 
prepaid billing system to maximise revenue collection.
Similar to the privatisation of  the revenue arm of  the power sector 
policy, the improvement in the management of  ECG is widely 
accepted by a majority of  the interviewed stakeholders (Figure 2) as 
an important solution to the off-taker constraint. Only AGI, PEF, 
and the KfW Development Bank oppose this policy, considering 
it insufficient to improve the creditworthiness of  the off-taker. The 
proposed alternative policy option is a prepaid metering system and 
independence of  the ECG.
While all but one (Solar Light Company, Ghana) gave maximum 
endorsement to the establishment of  a competitive off-taker market in 
the power sector, PURC, MiDA, UT Bank, TUC, PEF, and Solar Light 
were of  the view that the creation of  a good regulatory environment, 
with independent regulators and independent distribution and retailing 
could achieve similar results (Figure 3).
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Figure 1 Stakeholders’ support or opposition to privatisation of the revenue arm
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Figure 2 Stakeholders’ support or opposition to improved management of ECG policy
Figure 3 Stakeholders’ support or opposition to the establishment of competitive off-taker market policy
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Remove/reduce taxes on RET equipment for  
commercial and household use
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Figure 4 Stakeholders’ support or opposition to the establishment of a reliable and transparent full-cost tariff pricing system
Figure 5 Stakeholders’ support or opposition to full implementation of the Renewable Energy Act, 2011 (Act 832) policy
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The majority of  the stakeholders support the establishment of  a reliable 
and transparent full-cost tariff pricing system devoid of  government 
intervention to overcome the faulty power sector regulatory constraint 
(Figure 4). The opposing stakeholders did not propose an alternative 
policy. The dominance of  the supporting group, however, shows that 
many stakeholders want this policy to be implemented.
There is total support for the full implementation of  the Renewable 
Energy Act, 2011 (Act 832) by all institutions interviewed. This is 
considered by all the institutions as a means to overcome the faulty 
power sector regulatory constraint. Nevertheless, MiDA and IGC were 
of  the view that reducing or removing taxes on RET equipment is 
equally imperative (Figure 5).
The establishment of  RE financial instruments within domestic banks 
with lower interest rates is a potential policy that could overcome the 
binding constraint on access to appropriate finance. All the institutions 
except GII and PEF are in support of  this policy (Figure 6). Solar Light 
Company and the KfW Development Bank, however, proposed external 
fund sourcing as an alternative means to improving access to finance 
for RE projects. Clearly, there is not a mutually proposed alternative 
policy by the opposing and supporting stakeholders. The dominance of  
the supporting group, however, shows that many stakeholders want the 
establishment of  RE financial instruments within domestic banks with 
lower interest rates to be implemented.
External fund sourcing through loans, grants and climate change funds
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Figure 6 Stakeholders’ support or opposition to RE financial instruments
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7 Conclusion
The discussion in this article has underscored the critical role political 
economy dynamics have played as part of  the elements influencing 
the underinvestment within the RE landscape in Ghana. While several 
factors may constrain investment in the sector, previous research using the 
Green Investment Diagnostics framework and further in‑depth interviews 
with key stakeholders unearthed three binding constraints: off-taker 
risks, inadequate power regulation, and lack of  access to appropriate 
finance. The permanence of  these binding constraints is caused by 
dominant institutional, regulatory, and policy regimes on energy in the 
country, which are more fossil fuel inclined. While several policies or 
strategies could enhance RE in the country, inertia from the country’s 
leadership coupled with the weaknesses of  advocates, have precluded 
implementation. Ghana’s political leaders should champion those RE 
policies that already attract overwhelming support from stakeholders for 
renewables to have a chance in a fossil fuel‑dominated paradigm.
Notes
*  The author would like to thank the reviewers for their helpful 
comments on an earlier version of  this article.
1 ISSER, University of  Ghana (bawasius@hotmail.com;  
bawasius@isser.edu.gh).
2 www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Gov‑t‑
projects‑80‑of‑power‑plants‑to‑be‑thermal‑430382;  
www.urbanafrica.net/urban‑vocies/15378/.
3 Association of  Ghana Industries; Ghana Investment Promotion 
Council; Ghana Integrity Initiative; International Growth Centre; 
Institute of  Green Growth Solutions; Kasa Initiative Ghana; Kumasi 
Institute of  Technology and Environment; Millennium Development 
Authority; Private Enterprise Federation; Public Utilities Regulatory 
Commission of  Ghana; Public Utilities Workers Union; Solar Light 
Co. Ltd; Trade Union Congress; UT Bank Ghana Ltd; Energy 
Commission; Ghana Investment Promotion Centre; Africa Centre 
for Energy Policy (ACEP); Biogas Technologies Africa Ltd; Electricity 
Company of  Ghana; IMANI Ghana; Institute of  Fiscal Studies; 
Integrated Social Development Centre; African Energy Consortium; 
African Energy Consortium; Sahel–Sahara Bank; Blue Energy 
Company; Lekela Power; Ghana Capital Partners; NEK–Ghana; 
Volta River Authority; International Growth Centre.
4 The interviews took place between June 2016 and October 2016. 
Dates of  interviews were: 10 June 2016; 19 July 2016; 20 July 2016; 
22 July 2016; 12 August 2016; 19 August 2016; 8 September 2016; 
9 September 2016.
5 www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Tarzan‑disagrees‑
with‑ECG‑workers‑over‑privatization‑465173 (accessed 15 August 2016).
6 ‘For the first five years we are telling whoever comes as a 
concessionaire that you cannot reduce the level of  employment 
within ECG. It is a way of  guaranteeing people’s jobs at least for the 
next five years’ (Chief  executive officer, Millennium Development 
Authority).
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7 www.africanews.com/2016/01/20/ghana‑labour‑groups‑protest‑
increase‑in‑utility‑and‑taxes/ (accessed 15 August 2016).
8 The definitions of  the acronyms for these organisations are as follows: 
AGI – Association of  Ghana Industries; GIPC – Ghana Investment 
Promotion Council; GII – Ghana Integrity Initiative; IGC – 
International Growth Centre; IGGS – Institute of  Green Growth 
Solutions; KASA – Kasa Initiative Ghana; KITE – Kumasi Institute 
of  Technology and Environment; MiDA – Millennium Development 
Authority; PEF – Private Enterprise Federation; PURC –Public 
Utilities Regulatory Commission of  Ghana; PUWU – Public Utilities 
Workers Union; Solar Light – Solar Light Ghana; TUC – Trade 
Union Congress; UT Bank – UT Bank Ghana Ltd.
References 
Achrol, R.S.; Reve, T. and Ster, L.W. (1983) ‘The Environment of  
Marketing Channel Dyads: A Framework for Comparative Analysis’, 
Journal of  Marketing 47.4: 55–67
African Energy (2014) ‘Ghana: Mainstream Buys Ayitepa Wind Project, 
But Grid Capacity in Doubt’, African Energy 286, 9 October,  
https://archive.crossborderinformation.com/Article/Ghana+ 
Mainstream+buys+Ayitepa+wind+project%2c+but+grid+ 
capacity+ in+doubt.aspx?date=20141009# (accessed 10 September 
2017)
Amoako-Tuffor, J. and Asamoah, J. (2015) ‘ “Thinking Big’ and 
Reforming Ghana’s Energy Sector’, submitted to the African Center 
for Economic Transformation (ACET), Accra: ACET
Arndt, J. (1983) ‘The Political Economy Paradigm: Foundation for 
Theory Building in Marketing’, The Journal of  Marketing 47.4: 44–54
Baker, L.; Newell, P. and Phillips, J. (2014) ‘The Political Economy 
of  Energy Transitions: The Case of  South Africa’, New Political 
Economy 19.6: 791–818
Barnett, A. (2014) Political Considerations Relevant to Energy and Economic 
Growth, London: Department for International Development, 
file:///C:/Users/INNOCENT/Desktop/GGDA%20DOCS%20
AND%20PICS/EoD_HDYr3_09_Nov_2014_PEA_Energy.pdf  
(accessed 5 June 2016)
Barnett, A.; Stockbridge, M. and Kingsmill, W. (2016) ‘Political 
Economy of  Africa’s Power Sector’, Policy Practice Brief 10,  
http://thepolicypractice.com/publications/africas‑power‑sector/ 
(accessed 5 June 2016)
Birdsall, N. and Nellis, J. (2003) ‘Winners and Losers: Assessing the 
Distributional Impact of  Privatisation’, World Development 31.10: 1617–33
Brown, D.S. and Mobarak, A.M. (2009) ‘The Transforming 
Power of  Democracy: Regime Type and the Distribution of  
Electricity’, American Political Science Review 103.2: 193–213
Commander, S. (2012) A Guide to the Political Economy of  Reforming Energy 
Subsidies, Bonn: Institute for the Study of  Labor (IZA)
Eberhard, A.; Foster, V.; Briceno-Garmendia, C.; Quedraogo, F.; 
Camos, D. and Shkaratan, M. (2008) Africa Infrastructure Country 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’ 141–164 | 161
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Diagnostic Underpowered: The State of  the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, World Bank Report 48214, Washington DC: World Bank
Edjekumhene, I.; Amadu, M.B. and Brew‑Hammond, A. (2001) Power 
Sector Reform in Ghana: The Untold Story, Accra: Kumasi Institute of  
Technology and Environment (KITE)
Energy Commission of  Ghana (2016) National Energy Statistics 2006–2015, 
Accra: Strategic Planning and Policy Division, Energy Commission 
of  Ghana, http://energycom.gov.gh/files/National%20Energy%20
Statistics_2016.pdf  (accessed 13 July 2016)
Energy Commission of  Ghana (2015) 2015 Energy (Supply and Demand) 
Outlook for Ghana – Final Version, Energy Commission of  Ghana, 
http://energycom.gov.gh/files/Energy%20Outlook%20for%20
Ghana%20‑%202015.pdf  (accessed 13 July 2016)
Fattouh, B. and El-Katiri, L. (2015) A Brief  Political Economy of  Energy 
Subsidies in the Middle East and North Africa, Oxford: Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies, University of  Oxford
Gupta, G. and Köhlin, G. (2006) ‘Preferences for Domestic Fuel: 
Analysis with Socio-Economic Factors and Rankings in Kolkata, 
India’, Ecological Economics 57.1: 107–21
Hall, D.; Lobina, E. and Motte, R.D.L. (2005) ‘Public Resistance to 
Privatisation in Water and Energy’, Development in Practice 15.3–4: 
286–301
Hausmann, R.; Rodrik, D. and Velasco, A. (2004) Growth Diagnostics, 
John F. Kennedy School of  Government, Harvard University,  
http://growthlab.cid.harvard.edu/files/growthlab/files/growth-
diagnostics.pdf  (accessed 24 April 2017)
IEA Renewable Energy Working Party (2002) Renewable Energy into the 
Mainstream, International Energy Agency,  
http://library.umac.mo/ebooks/b1362376x.pdf  (accessed 
9 September 2017)
Isoaho, K.; Goritz, A. and Schulz, N. (2016) Governing Clean Energy 
Transitions in China and India: A Comparative Political Economy 
Analysis, UNU‑WIDER Working Paper 2016/28, Helsinki: World 
Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU‑WIDER)
ISSER (2005) Guide to Electric Power in Ghana, Legon: Institute of  
Statistical, Social and Economics Research, University of  Ghana
Jacobsson, S. and Lauber, V. (2006) ‘The Politics and Policy of  Energy 
System Transformation: Explaining the German Diffusion of  
Renewable Energy Technology’, Energy Policy 34.3: 256–76
Khan, M.H. (2011) ‘The Political Settlement and its Evolution in 
Bangladesh’, unpublished monograph, London: School of  Oriental 
and African Studies, University of  London
Mehrotra, S. and Delamonica, E. (2005) ‘The Private Sector and 
Privatization in Social Services: Is the Washington Consensus 
“Dead”?’, Global Social Policy 5.2: 141–74
Ministry of  Energy (MoE) (2010) National Energy Policy, Accra: 
Government of  Ghana, www.mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/pbb/
ENERGY%20POLICY-%20February%2013,%202010%20FINAL.
pdf  (accessed 22 August 2015)
162 | Bawakyillenuo The Political Economy of Renewable Energy Investment in Ghana
Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’
NDPC (National Development Planning Commission) (2014) Ghana 
Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA II), Accra: Government 
of  Ghana, https://s3.amazonaws.com/ndpc‑static/pubication/
GSGDA+II+2014‑2017.pdf  (accessed 12 May 2016)
Nellis, J. (2003) ‘Effects of  Privatization on Income and Wealth 
Distribution’, presentation to World Bank Energy Week 2003, 
Washington DC, 24–27 February
Newell, P. and Mulvaney, D. (2013) ‘The Political Economy of  the 
“Just Transition” ’, The Geographical Journal 179.2: 132–40
Newell, P.; Phillips, J.; Pueyo, A.; Kirumba, E.; Ozor, N. and Urama, K. 
(2014) The Political Economy of  Low-Carbon Energy in Kenya, IDS 
Working Paper 445, Brighton: IDS
Oda, H. and Tsujita, Y. (2010) The Determinants of  Rural Electrification in 
Bihar, India, IDE Discussion Paper 254, Chiba, Japan: IDE‑JETRO
Opam, M. and Turkson, J. (2000) ‘Power Sector Restructuring in 
Ghana’, in J. Turkson (ed.), Power Sector Reform in Sub-Saharan African, 
London: Macmillan Press
Opam, M.; United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); 
and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UN ECA) 
(1995) ‘Institution Building in the Energy Sector of  Africa: A Case 
Study of  the Ghana Power Sector Reform Programme’, UN ECA 
Sixth Regional Conference on Mineral Resources Development and 
Utilization in Africa, Accra, Ghana, 14–23 November
Painuly, J.P. (2001) ‘Barriers to Renewable Energy Penetration: A 
Framework for Analysis’, Renewable Energy 24.1: 73–89
Phillips, J.; Hailwood, E. and Brooks, A. (2016) ‘Sovereignty, the 
“Resource Curse” and the Limits of  Good Governance: A Political 
Economy of  Oil in Ghana’, Review of  African Political Economy 
43.147: 26–42, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2015.1049520 
(accessed 6 September 2017)
Power, M.; Newell, P.; Baker, L.; Bulkeley, H.; Kirshner, J. and 
Smith, A. (2016) ‘The Political Economy of  Energy Transitions in 
Mozambique and South Africa: The Role of  the Rising Powers’, 
Energy Research and Social Science 17: 10–19
Pueyo, A.; Spratt, S.; Bawakyillenuo, S. and Osiolo H.H. (2017) 
Green Investment Diagnostics for Africa: What are the Binding Constraints to 
Investment in Renewables in Kenya and Ghana? IDS Research Report 83, 
Brighton: IDS
Schmitz, H. (2012) PEACH: Methodology, Brighton: IDS
Scott, A. and Seth, P. (2013) The Political Economy of  Electricity 
Distribution in Developing Countries, London: Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI)
Sdralevich, M.C.A.; Sab, M.R.; Zouhar, M.Y. and Albertin, G. (2014) 
Subsidy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa: Recent Progress and 
Challenges Ahead, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund
Sustainable Energy Regulation and Policymaking for Africa (n.d.) Power 
Reform of  the Power Sector in Africa: Module 4,  
http://africa‑toolkit.reeep.org/modules/Module4.pdf  (accessed 
26 July 2016)
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’ 141–164 | 163
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Tsebelis, G. (2002) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, 
New York NY: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press
UNEP (2015) Green Economy Assessment Report: Ghana, Nairobi: United 
Nations Environment Programme
UNEP (2013) Green Economy Scoping Study: Ghana, Nairobi: United 
Nations Environment Programme
This page is intentionally left blank
Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’
164 | Bawakyillenuo The Political Economy of Renewable Energy Investment in Ghana
